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I. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
Daniel Kemmis
A. The Montana Provisions
The 1972 Montana Constitution contains two environmental
provisions. The right to a clean and healthful environment is the
first of the fundamental rights guaranteed by article H, section 3:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They
include the right to a clean and healthful environment .... I
Article IX is concerned exclusively with the environment and natu-
ral resources. The most important environmental guarantees of that
article are contained in the three paragraphs of its first section:
(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean
and healthful environment in Montana for present and future gen-
erations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and en-
forcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the pro-
tection of the environmental life support system from degradation
and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion
and degradation of natural resources.'
These provisions of the 1972 constitution have no counterpart
in the predecessor 1889 constitution or in the United States Consti-
tution. As a result, Montana lawyers and judges approach the inter-
pretation of the new provisions with no precedents to guide them in
determining the meaning and consequences of these environmental
guarantees. As with other newly created rights in state constitu-
tions, the Montana environmental provisions will only acquire sig-
nificance to the extent that Montana lawyers and judges give appro-
priate weight to their constitutional status.
That work began on a healthy tenor in 1976, when the Montana
supreme court decided Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of
Health3 (known in Montana and hereinafter referred to as "Beaver
Creek I"). In a thoughtful opinion by Justice (now Chief Justice)
Haswell, the court came as near as any court in the nation to giving
a constitutional guarantee of environmental rights the respect and
1. MONT. CONST. art. H, § 3.
2. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
3. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences (33 St.
Rep. 711 (1976). The decision was later withdrawn in Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of
Health and Environmental Sciences, Mont. -, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976). Justice Haswell
included the entire majority opinion in the first decision in his dissent to the second decision.
Future citations will be to the dissent.
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the weight which its constitutional status requires. The decision was
withdrawn upon rehearing of the case,' and therefore it is not pre-
cedent for future Montana decisions. Because the second decision
avoided the constitutional question,5 the withdrawn opinion may
still supply some indication of how the court will treat the environ-
mental provisions in a future case in which a constitutional question
is addressed. Apart from whatever value it has as a harbinger of
future decisions, Beaver Creek I serves as an excellent example of
how the constitutional guarantee of environmental rights should be
applied and interpreted. It is primarily in that capacity that it will
be cited in the following pages.
This article will discuss a number of issues which are likely to
be litigated in connection with the environmental provisions in
Montana's constitution. Those issues include standing, the question
of whether the provisions are self-executing, and the standard to be
applied under the provisions. Since most of these issues have been
litigated in other states with constitutional guarantees of environ-
mental rights, the decisions of other state courts will be a major
focus of discussion. Beaver Creek I will also be discussed in connec-
tion with any of the issues addressed by that opinion. Because the
issues likely to arise under a state constitutional guarantee of envi-
ronmental rights are suggested in part by the cases and commentary
which have urged the discovery of a federal constitutional guaran-
tee, it is useful to begin with the federal history in this area.
B. Environment and the Federal Constitution
Although there is no explicit guarantee of environmental rights
in the United States Constitution, several commentators have
argued that such rights are implicitly guaranteed by that docu-
ment.' Environmental rights are said either to be implied by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments' protection of life,7 or to be among
the rights "retained by the people" and protected by the ninth
amendment.' These arguments have not persuaded the federal
courts. Several federal district courts have rejected the argument
that environmental rights are protected by the due process clauses
4. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, -
Mont. ., 559 P.2d 1157 (1976).
5. Id. at __, 559 P.2d at 1160.
6. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an
Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L. J. 203 (1974); Pettigrew, A Constitutional Right to
Freedom from Ecocide, 2 ENVT'L. L. 1 (1971); Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected
Environment, 56 VA. L. Rav. 458 (1970).
7. Klipsch, supra note 6, at 222-30.
8. Pettigrew, supra note 6, at 5-20.
1978]
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/2
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,9 and the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has done the same."0 The ninth amendment
argument has fared no better. The prevailing position was expressed
by the District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Tanner
v. Armco Steel Corp.:"
The Ninth Amendment, through its "penumbra" or otherwise,
embodies no legally assertable right to a healthful environment.' 2
To date it appears that only one federal court has discovered
protection for the environment in the United States Constitution.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf,'3 Montana
citizens sought to enjoin the operation of a kraft paper mill near
Missoula because its sulfur emissions allegedly threatened their
health. The District Court for the District of Montana observed that
health sustains life, which in turn is protected by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. From this the court inferred "that each of
us is constitutionally protected in our natural and personal state of
life and health."" The court implied that the ninth amendment also
afforded protection to human health.'5 But neither of these constitu-
tional claims could sustain an action against a private corporation
where there was no state action underlying the alleged pollution."6
Thus the conclusion that the Federal Constitution protects some
environmental rights was only dictum, and even as dictum it has
no support elsewhere in federal adjudication.
C. Environment and State Constitutions
As the likelihood of a federal constitutional guarantee of envi-
ronmental rights has become more remote, commentators have di-
rected more attention to state constitutional provisions. 7 Several
state constitutions now contain environmental provisions."
9. Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305, 311 (N.D. Ohio
1974); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
10. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).
11. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
12. Id. at 535. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
13. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf, 1 E.R.C. 1640 (D. Mont. 1970).
14. Id. at 1641.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Comment, A Constitutional Right to a Liveable Environment in Oregon, 55 ORE.
L. REv. 239 (1976); Tobin, Some Observations on the Use of State Constitutions to Protect
the Environment, 3 ENVT'L AFF. 473 (1974); Fine, Matsakis and Spector, Project Report:
Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. Civ. RTs - Civ. LIB. L. REv. 271
(1973); Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193 (1972).
18. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (1968); kLL. CONST. art. XI (1970); MASS. CONST. art. XLIX
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Whereas the protection of environmental rights by the Federal Con-
stitution is at best conjectural, there is no doubt about the existence
of environmental rights in these states. If it is possible in any way
for people to recognize or create new rights, then clearly they may
do so by proclaiming those rights in their constitutions. And if the
concept of "fundamental rights" has any meaning, then the fact
that people declare in their basic covenants that they have a right
to a clean or habitable environment is evidence, not only of the
right's existence, but of its fundamental nature as well.
Even within a constitution, the placement, wording, or history
of particular provisions may indicate that some rights are intended
to be more fundamental, and thus to have more "weight," than
others. The same factors may signify that environmental rights have
more weight or a different meaning in one state than in another. The
following discussion of issues which arise under environmental guar-
antees will take account of the differences in wording, history, and
placement of the various state provisions.
D. Issues Arising Under Environmental Guarantees
1. Standing.
Standing is a paramount problem in environmental litigation
because the interest which people have in their environment has
been recognized and vaguely delineated only recently. Standing to
sue has traditionally been contingent on a showing of direct injury
to the plaintiff's property or civil rights. 9 The United States Su-
preme Court has recently recognized that persons claiming injury
to aesthetic or other environmental interests may now have stand-
ing," but this is true only when the action is brought under the
federal Administrative Procedure Act.2' This limitation is important
for two reasons. First, the Administrative Procedure Act would not
apply to any action against private individuals. Therefore neither
the federal doctrine of environmental standing nor any state doc-
trine patterned after it will allow a person to vindicate environmen-
tal interests against another private individual. Moreover, standing
which rests on a statutory basis is subject to extinction by legislative
action. While there may be little danger that the federal Adminis-
art. XIV, § 4 (1970); N.C. CONST. art XIV, § 5 (1972); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1971); R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 17 (1970); VA. CONST. art. XI (1971). (Dates refer to date of adoption of the
environmental provisions.)
19. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Mitchell v. District Court, 128 Mont. 325, 339, 275 P.2d 642,
649 (1954).
20. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972); United States v. Students Chal-
lenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
21. 60 Stat. 237-44, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
1978]
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trative Procedure Act will be amended in such a way that the fed-
eral doctrine of environmental standing would be undermined, the
same assurance is not justified with respect to standing based on
state statutes. Environmental standing may be shielded against
legislative infringement by basing standing upon a constitutional
guarantee of environmental rights.
Environmental provisions in state constitutions affect standing
in several ways. The most direct approach is embodied in the Illinois
Constitution, which explicitly gives all citizens standing to sue on
behalf of the environment:
Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person
may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private,
through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limi-
tation and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by
law.1
2
A similar provision, when offered in the floor debate on article
IX of the Montana Constitution, was defeated by a vote of 43-47.2
The convention also rejected other proposals to authorize citizen
suits,24 including one limited to suits against the state.25 This history
makes it clear that article IX of the Montana Constitution does not
directly authorize citizen suits. The transcript leaves no doubt that
the same conclusion applies to article II, section 3.2
A constitution may also broaden environmental standing by the
inclusion of a public trust concept in an environmental provision.
For example, under the Pennsylvania Constitution:
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property
of all people, including generations yet to come .... As trustee of
these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.
As beneficiaries of such a trust, all citizens would have standing to
enforce it, which means that all citizens would have standing to sue
for the conservation of natural resources. Although various delegate
proposals urged adoption of a public trust concept in the Montana
Constitution, 2 neither the Bill of Rights Committee nor the Natural
Resources Committee recommended such a concept.29 When a pro-
22. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
23. Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention, 3843 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Proceedings].
24. Id. at 3830, 3866, 3918.
25. Id. at 3899.
26. See the exchange between Delegates Burkhardt and Dahood, Proceedings at
5046-50.
27. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
28. Montana Constitutional Convention, Delegate Proposals No. 12, 162 (1972).
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vision similar to that of the Pennsylvania Constitution was proposed
on the convention floor during the debate on article IX, the proposal
was defeated by a vote of 34-58.0 It is clear that the Montana Con-
stitution does not explicitly extend standing to citizens as benefici-
aries of a public trust. And since what is explicitly rejected can
hardly be adopted by implication, it cannot be argued that the
constitution implies a public trust concept.'
A constitution may indirectly influence standing by requiring
the legislature to provide remedies for the infringement of environ-
mental rights. Under such a constitutional directive to provide rem-
edies,32 the Michigan Legislature passed the Michigan Environmen-
tal Protection Act,3 3 which provides for citizen suits. Article IX,
section 1(3) of the Montana Constitution directs the legislature to
provide adequate remedies to prevent degradation of the environ-
mental life support system or unreasonable depletion of natural
resources. Legislation patterned on the Michigan model has been
introduced in Montana, 34 arguably in fulfillment of the legislative
duty imposed by article IX, section 1(3), but the legislation has not
been enacted.
Despite the failure of the convention and the legislature to ex-
plicitly extend environmental standing to all citizens, the Montana
constitutional provisions still may have a substantial impact on
standing by redefining "injury" for particular individuals. By guar-
anteeing every Montanan the heretofore unrecognized "right to a
clean and healthful environment, '35 the Montana Constitution ap-
pears on its face to transform any infringement of that right into a
legal injury. In fact, such a conclusion seems to be the minimum
that is required by any reading of the constitution which recognizes
the clearly fundamental nature of the environmental right. If the
constitution is read in this way, any person whose own surroundings
are rendered unclean or unhealthful has standing to seek a remedy.
There is reason to believe that the Montana supreme court will
adopt this interpretation of the constitution. In fact, it has already
done so in Beaver Creek I,3" a decision which was later withdrawn
30. Id. at 3789.
31. While the constitution does not impose a public trust upon the Montana environ-
ment generally, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 81-103 (1947) does impose a public trust on
state lands. Article IX, section 1 of the Montana Constitution may make the protection of
environmental quality on state lands a part of the state's duty as fiduciary of that trust.
32. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52.
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN., §§ 691-1201 to 1207.,
34. H.B. 1076, 43d Legis. (1974) failed to pass the House of Representatives. HOUSE J.,
43d Legis. 467 (1974). S.B. 203, 44th Legis. (1975) passed the legislature but was vetoed by
the governor. SENATE J., 44th Legis. 1607 (1975).
35. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
36. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences,
Mont. -_, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting).
1978] 229
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/2
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
for reasons unrelated to standing." In that case an action for injunc-
tion and declaratory judgment against a proposed subdivision was
brought by the Montana Wilderness Association and the Gallatin
Sportsmen's Association. Because it was clear that members of
these associations used the area in question, the standing issue was
essentially whether such non-proprietary users had standing to sue
in defense of the area's environment. The plaintiffs alleged that the
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences had filed an
inadequate environmental impact statement under the Montana
Environmental Policy Act. 3 Noting that this was a case of first
impression on standing under MEPA, the court reviewed standing
requirements in Montana case law and found three criteria to be
controlling:
(1) The complaining party must clearly allege past, present or
threatened injury to a property or civil right.
(2) The alleged injury must be distinguishable from the injury to
the public generally, but the injury need not be exclusive to the
complaining party.
(3) The issue must represent a "case" or "controversy" as is
within the judicial cognizance of the state sovereignty.39
The question, then, was whether an alleged injury to the plain-
tiffs' environment satisfied these criteria., The court acknowledged
that under Sierra Club"0 and S. C.R.A.P. ' a person whose aesthetic
or recreational interests were injured by federal agency action had
standing to sue in federal court. But the Montana supreme court did
not find these cases dispositive of the standing question in Montana,
because of their statutory basis:
Sierra Club and SCRAP underscore the fact that in the federal
courts environmental standing has developed in the statutory con-
text of the federal Administrative Procedure Act.4"
Instead of relying upon the federal development of standing under
a statutory umbrella, the Montana court found standing justified by
the Montana Constitution:
First, the complaint alleges a threatened injury to a civil right of
the Associations' members, that is, the "inalienable ... right to a
37. Montana Wilderness Ass'n. v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, -
Mont. -, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976).
38. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 69-6504 (1947).
39. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, -
Mont. , , 559 P.2d 1157, 1165 (1976)(Haswell J., dissenting).
40. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
41. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.),
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
42. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, -
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clean and healthful environment," Article 1I, Section 3, 1972 Mon-
tana Constitution. This constitutional provision, enacted in recog-
nition of the fact that Montana citizens' right to a clean and
healthful environment is on a parity with more traditional inalien-
able rights, certainly places the issue of unlawful environmental
degradation within the judicial cognizance. 3
As noted above," this decision basing standing on the constitu-
tion is not the law in Montana, but there is no precedent to prevent
its adoption in future decision. Two of the supporters of the first
decision are still on the bench, 5 while only one of the second deci-
sion's majority is still a member of the court." The question of
whether the Montana Constitution broadens standing in environ-
mental cases clearly remains open.
2. Are the Montana Provisions Self-Executing?
If a court finds that a plaintiff has standing under an environ-
mental rights provision, it may still face another threshold question:
is the environmental provision self-executing, or does it require leg-
islative action to make it effective? This question has been the
subject of considerable controversy 7 following the Pennsylvania
supreme court's decision in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower, Inc. 1 The narrow holding of that decision was
that construction of an observation tower near the Gettysburg Bat-
tlefield could not be enjoined under the environmental protection
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution." The court's opinion,
supported by a plurality of the justices, based its holding on a find-
ing that the environmental provision was not self-executing."
The intermediate level Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
has refused to consider the Gettysburg conclusion on self-execution
to be the law in Pennsylvania, because that conclusion, unlike the
narrow holding of the case, was not endorsed by a majority of the
43. Id. at 1167.
44. See pp. 224-25 supra.
45. Justices Haswell and Daly.
46. Justice Harrison.
47. Tobin, supra note 17, at 481; Fox, Environmental Protection - A Constitutional
Limitation on the Land Use Control Powers of Pennsylvania Municipalities, 36 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 255, 258-66 (1974); Lantz, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's New Environmental Rights
Amendment and the Gettysburg Tower Case, 78 DICK. L. Rlv. 331, 333-47 (1973); Pearson
and Hutton, Land Use in Pennsylvania: Any Change Since the Environmental Rights
Amendment?, 14 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 165, 186-94 (1976).
48. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311
A.2d 588 (1973).
49. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 27.
50. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 205,
311 A.2d 588, 592 (1973).
19781
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higher court." Commentators have criticized the Gettysburg deci-
sion as an overly restrictive interpretation of the Pennsylvania envi-
ronmental rights provision.52 For a number of reasons, the
Gettysburg decision does not appear to be an appropriate guide for
the interpretation of the Montana provisions.
One of the Pennsylvania supreme court's arguments against
that state's provision being self-executing was the fact that the pro-
vision expressed general policy but did not provide a judicially man-
ageable standard for review.5 3 The history of the Montana provisions
should preclude that argument's acceptance by the Montana courts.
The version of article IX, section 1 originally proposed by the Natu-
ral Resources Committee contained no adjectives describing the
kind of environment to be maintained. 5 Delegate Brazier supported
that proposal in floor debate, explaining that the addition of adjec-
tives would enable the courts to interpret the provisions, with the
result that the interpretations would not be subject to legislative
control. 5 The convention clearly rejected that approach and chose
to encourage judicial interpretation when it amended the committee
proposal by adding the adjectives "clean and healthful" to
"environment. 59 The same words were contained in the environ-
mental rights guarantee which was subsequently added to article II,
section 3.57 This history makes it clear that the convention intended
the Montana provisions to be subject to judicial interpretation.
They therefore cannot be considered non-self-executing for lack of
a judicial standard.
The Pennsylvania supreme court also distinguished constitu-
tional provisions which limit governmental activity from those
which expand state power or place an affirmative duty on the legis-
lature.5 8 The court argued that only provisions in the first category
are self-executing.59 Under this approach, article IX, section 1 of the
Montana Constitution would not be self-executing, because it im-
poses an affirmative duty on the legislature. Clearly that duty itself
is not self-executing, neither is it enforceable, as the convention was
51. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 28, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973), aff'd, 14 Pa.
Commw. 491, 323 A.2d 407 (1974).
52. Pearson and Hutton, supra note 44, at 188-91; Lantz, supra note 44, at 338-47.
53. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 198-
99, 311 A.2d 588, 591 (1973). Cf. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 165 (8th ed. 1927);
Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900).
54. Proceedings at 3701.
55. Id. at 3771, 3814.
56. Id. at 3857.
57. Id. at 5054.
58. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 200,
311 A.2d 588, 592 (1973).
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frequently reminded."0 But the other portions of article IX, section
1 do not lose their capacity for self-execution merely by the addition
of the legislative duty:
A constitutional provision does not lose its self-executing quality
merely because it provides that the legislature shall by appropriate
legislation provide for carrying it into effect.6
In Beaver Creek I,6" the Montana supreme court acknowledged
that article IX, section 1 by its terms required legislative action.
3
But the court intimated that if the legislature failed to fulfill its
duty under article IX, section 1(2), the court could still enforce the
remainder of that section.
If the court followed this reasoning in a future decision, it could
enforce the article IX, section 1(1) duty of the "state and each
person" to "maintain and improve a clean and healthful environ-
ment",6 5 even in the absence of legislative action.
Even if the court held article IX not to be self-executing in any
sense, the article HI, section 2 guarantee of environmental rights is
clearly self-executing. The "clean and healthful" language provides
a basis for judicial review; the provision undeniably operates as a
limitation upon governmental activity, and there is no affirmative
duty imposed upon the legislature. These factors satisfy all the cri-
teria of a self-executing provision. 7 The history of the provision
supports the same conclusion.
3. Judicial Standards.
Courts must develop standards for deciding what constitutes
60. Proceedings, at 3859, 3861-62. Cf. COOLEY, supra note 50, at 165: "Sometimes the
constitution in terms requires the legislature to enact laws on a particular subject; and here
it is obvious that the requirement has only moral force: the legislature ought to obey it; but
the right intended to be given is only assured when the legislation is voluntarily enacted."
61. COOLEY, supra note 50, at 170.
62. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, -
Mont. -, - 559 P.2d 1157 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at - , 559 P.2d at 1168.
64. Id.
65. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § I(I).
66. In Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900), the United States Supreme Court recognized
that a provision which imposes an affirmative duty might still have some effect apart from
that duty, and suggested that the remainder might be self-executing. The Court said "In
other words, it is self-executing only so far as it is susceptible of execution." 179 U.S. at 403.
Cf. CooiLEY, supra note 50, at 169.
67. COOLEY, supra note 50, at 165-72.
68. During the convention floor debate on article II, section 4 (the individual dignity
section), the Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, Delegate Dahood, mentioned that
constitutions are presumed to be self-executing, particularly within their bills of rights. Dele-
gate Robinson asked if this would apply to the environmental rights language in article II,
section 3. Dahood replied that the section 3 environmental right would be self-executing for
anyone who was directly injured. Proceedings at 5067-68.
10
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an abridgement of a constitutionally protected environmental right.
It is precisely in the formation of such standards that the "weight"
of rights is determined. Dworkin argues that the weight of a right is
its capacity to withstand competition from considerations of social
policy. 9 In the area of environmental litigation, the competing con-
siderations of social policy are likely to involve concepts like eco-
nomic progress, or administrative cost or convenience. The degree
to which courts balance such considerations against environmental
rights determines the weight of those rights. But a court is not at
liberty to assign weight to rights at random. In particular, a right
which acquires constitutional status should be assigned a weight
commensurate with that status.70
In his opinion in Beaver Creek I,' Justice Haswell recognized
that the constitutional status of a right makes it more
"fundamental" than it would be without such status. Referring to
an argument that a fundamental right may not be created by stat-
ute but must be "derived from the fundamental law,"7 Haswell
wrote:
We concur and find an inalienable, or fundamental, right was
created in our fundamental law, Article II, Section 3, 1972 Mon-
tana Constitution.
73
Justice Haswell also observed that this provision was "enacted in
recognition of the fact that Montana citizens' right to a clean and
healthful environment is on a parity with more traditional inaliena-
ble rights .... 74
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court also recognized the
parity between an environmental right and other more established
rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution:
We find no more reason to hold that Section 27 needs legislative
definition than that the peoples' freedoms of religion and speech
should wait upon the pleasure of the General Assembly.
75
Yet in fashioning a standard of judicial review under the environ-
mental rights provision, the same court abandoned the concept of
parity between the environmental right and other fundamental
rights. The court chose a standard which balances environmental
69. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1977).
70. Id. at 133.
71. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences,
Mont. -, - 559 P.2d 1157 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at , 559 P.2d at 1168.
73. Id.
74. Id. at -. 559 P.2d at 1167.
75. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231,
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rights against policy considerations of economic growth and devel-
opment."6 This standard requires a court to ask three questions con-
cerning any alleged infringement of an environmental right:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regula-
tions relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's natural
resources?
(2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the
environmental incursion to a minimum?
(3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the chal-
lenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be
derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of
discretion?"
It is inconceivable that the courts of Pennsylvania or of any
other state would ever review a governmental infringement of free
speech or any other established fundamental right by asking
whether the government had made ". . . a reasonable effort to
reduce the . . . incursion to a minimum," 8 or whether the
harm which will result from the challenged decision or action so
clearly outweigh[s] the benefits to be derived therefrom that to
proceed further would be an abuse of discretion."
We would be shocked if a court upheld an infringement of free
speech because some economic gain outweighed an individual's par-
tial loss of liberty. Yet fundamental rights like the right of free
speech have the "power to withstand such competition,"8' not be-
cause that power inheres in the rights themselves, but because
courts have consistently refused to balance these rights against con-
siderations of social policy. The right to a clean environment could
some day seem as naturally inviolable as the right of free speech,
but only if judges pay as much respect to the constitutional status
of the new right as their predecessors paid to the older right when
it was new.
One argument against applying a non-balancing standard to
environmental rights is that the application of a stricter test might
halt all changes in land use. In Payne v. Kassab,"' the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court rejected a standard which would find uncon-
stitutional any activity which would amount to an "intrusion" upon
76. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 29, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973), aff'd, 14 Pa.




80. R. DWOPKIN, supra note 69, at 92.
81. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commnw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973), aff'd, 14 Pa. Commnw. 491,
323 A.2d 407 (1974).
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or "distraction" from historic or aesthetic values.12 Implying that
the application of such a standard would halt all economic develop-
ment,8 3 the court chose a balancing standard instead.84 If the
"intrusion or distraction" test would bar all land use changes, it
probably demands more than human society is capable of, and
therefore could not have been within the contemplation of the fra-
mers. But rejection of such an historically strict standard does not
leave balancing as the only alternative. A brief consideration of a
non-balancing standard under the Montana provisions should make
this clear.
Under such a standard, any impairment of the cleanliness or
healthfulness of a person's environment would be an infringement
of his rights. Courts would have to decide what they mean by clean-
lines and healthfulness, and what quality and quantity of proof
they would require to establish an infringement of those factors.
This would be a difficult task, but the history of tort law demon-
strates clearly that the judicial system is equipped for the task. 5
The challenge increases if "clean and healthful" also implies that
aesthetic values must be protected. In State v. Bernhard," the Mon-
tana supreme court held that the "clean and healthful" language
in article II, section 3 could sustain an exercise of the police power
to preserve aesthetic values.87 If "clean and healthful" implies
"aesthetic" in that context, it is difficult to discern why it would
not also imply that aesthetic values are among those protected by
the constitution. Under the standard proposed here, then, any
impairment of the aesthetic value of a person's environment would
be an infringement of her constitutionally protected right.
This is not the same as the "intrusion or distraction" test re-
jected by the Pennsylvania court.8 Some people may consider that
any human alteration of a natural setting constitutes aesthetic im-
pairment, but a court would be no more constrained to adopt that
standard than it is to make the most scrupulous person's standard
of care the norm in tort law. The point here is not to propose a
definition of aesthetic impairment, or of an impairment of cleanli-
ness and healthfulness, but simply to suggest that courts are capa-
82. Id. at __, 312 A.2d at 94.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., the development of a definition of nuisance: Iverson v. Dilno, 44 Mont.
270, 274, 119 P. 719, 721 (1911); Cavanaugh v. Corbin Copper Co., 55 Mont. 173, 178, 174 P.
184, 185 (1918); Fagan v. Silver, 57 Mont. 427, 430, 188 P. 900, 901 (1920).
86. State v. Bernhard, __ Mont. __, 568 P.2d 136 (1977).
87. Id. at -, 568 P.2d at 138.
88. Payne Y. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 29, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973), aff'd, 14 Pa.
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ble of devising such definitions 9 and that the task of defining these
terms is not at all the same as the "task of weighing conflicting
environmental and social concerns .... " 0 which the balancing stan-
dard imposes. Under the balancing test, a proven impairment of
environmental values would be constitutionally permissible if
broadly defined benefits outweighed the harm to the individual.
Under the test proposed here, once a court decided upon a definition
of environmental values, any impairment of those values would con-
stitute an invasion of protected rights. Under this standard, a clean
and healthful environment could endure, as free speech and other
fundamental rights have endured, from one generation to another.
E. Conclusion
The federal courts have not recognized a constitutionally pro-
tected environmental right. As a result, environmental guarantees
in state constitutions will probably receive more attention than
most courts traditionally have paid to state constitutional rights.
Among the problems which state courts will face in interpreting
environmental provisions are issues of standing, standards of re-
view, and the question of whether or not environmental guarantees
are self-executing. How courts handle these and other issues will
depend upon how responsive they are to the constitutional status of
these new rights. The Montana supreme court can look to a with-
drawn opinion which still exists in the form of a dissent9' for guid-
ance in the task of taking Montana's environmental right seriously.
89. "Courts, which have attacked with gusto such indistinct concepts as due process,
equal protection, unreasonable search and seizure, and cruel and unusual punishment, will
surely not hesitate before such comparatively certain measures as clean air, pure water and
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values. The most uncertain of these, esthetic values, has
been the subject of instant judicial recognition in the fields of planning and zoning." Com-
monwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231, 243-44, 302
A.2d 886, 892 (1973), a'd, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
90. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 29, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973), aff'd, 14 Pa.
Commw. 491, 323 A.2d 407 (1974).
91. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences,
Mont.., -, 559 P.2d 1157, 1161-77 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting).
1978]
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/2
